Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
3-2005

Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem
Peter K. Yu
peter_yu@msn.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/382

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM
PeterK Yu"
2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The title of this symposium is "Intellectual Property, Sustainable
Development, and Endangered Species." When I was planning this event,
some participants suggested that I be careful about using the term "sustainable
development," while others were concerned about their limited knowledge of
endangered species. Nobody, however, has raised any questions about the use
ofthe term "intellectual property," which many have considered controversial.
Critics have identified two major problems in using the term. First, as
Richard Stallman, one of the term's leading critics, has noted, it is an " unwise
generalization" that is biased and confusing.' By bringing together different
sets of rights that originated differently, protected different subject matter, and
raised different policy questions, this umbrella term encourages simplistic
thinking that ignores the different characteristics and limitations of copyrights,
patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and other neighboring rights.

* Copyright

© 2005 Peter K. Yu. All rights reserved. Associate Professor of Law &

Director, Intellectual Property & Communications Law Program, Michigan State University
College of Law; Adjunct Professor of Telecommunication, Information Studies and Media &
Faculty Associate, James H. and Mary B. Quello Center for Telecommunication Management
& Law, College of Communication Arts & Sciences, Michigan State University. This essay is
based on the introductory remarks delivered at the "Intellectual Property, Sustainable
Development, and Endangered Species: Understanding the Dynamics of the Information
Ecosystem" symposium held at Michigan State University College of Law on March 26-27,
2004. Ideas articulated in this essay benefit from comments from and insights of the participants
of the "International Symposium on the Information Society, Human Dignity and Human
Rights" at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and McGill University Faculty of Law. The author
would like to thank Richard Stallman for repeatedly warning him about the danger of using the
term "intellectual property" and his patience in suggesting alternatives to the many confusing
and loaded words used in the intellectual property debate. He is also grateful to the past and
present members of the Michigan State Law Review, in particular Thomas Beckius, Shannon
Burke, Meagan Johnson, and Michael Wilson, for assistance in making this event possible,
Alexander Kanous for excellent research assistance, and Joseph Gavin and Christopher Moceri
for thoughtful and thorough editing. Adam Mossoff read a substantially different first draft and
hated it, but is much happier with this final version. Of course, he is now responsible for some
of the "heretical tendencies" in this essay.
I. Richard M. Stallman, Some Confusing or Loaded Words and Phrases That Are
Worth Avoiding, Free Software Foundation, at http://www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/words-toavoid.html (last modified Feb. 12, 2005).
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Second, because the term includes the word "property," it glosses over
the difference between abstract ideas and physical objects, thereby
perpetuating the misunderstanding that one can develop property entitlements
in ideas and information. As Professor Mark Lemley warned us, the property
label may tempt courts, lawyers, and commentators to continue the trend of
treating intellectual property just like real property.2 Such temptation is even
more powerful among judges in civil law countries, who are concerned that
limiting intellectual property rights would raise questions of government
takings of private property.3
To highlight the term's illegitimacy, critics have traced the origin of the
term to the 1960s, when the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
was established. 4 As they claimed, intellectual property did not acquire
property attributes until a few decades ago, and rights holders have
systematically used the term to distort and confuse policy issues,5 and to seize
rhetorical advantages.' Intellectual property rights therefore do not represent
universal values. This argument is powerful, and the temptation to link the
term to WIPO is simply irresistible. Even Professor William Cornish, a
distinguished intellectual property scholar, could not help but make the
following observation in the highly-regarded Clarendon Lectures at the
University of Oxford:

2. Mark A. Lemley, Property,IntellectualProperty,andFreeRiding, 83 TEx. L. REv.
1031, 1033 (2005).
3. Thanks to Professor Carlos Correa for pointing this out.
4. As Professor Mark Lemley recounted:
The modem use of the term "intellectual property" as a common descriptor of the
field probably traces to the foundation of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) by the United Nations. Since that time, numerous groups such
as the American Patent Law Association and the ABA Section on Patent, Trademark,
and Copyright Law have changed their names (to the American Intellectual Property
Law Association and the ABA Section on Intellectual Property Law, respectively).
There were certainly uses of the term in the literature well before this time, especially
on the Continent. These uses do not seem to have reflected a unified property-based
approach to the separate doctrines of patent, trademark, and copyright, however.
Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorshipand the Rhetoric ofProperty,75 TEx. L. REv. 873,89596 n. 123 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

(1996)) (citations omitted).

S. See Richard M. Stallman, Did You Say "IntellectualProperty"?It's a Seductive
Mirage, Free Software Foundation, at http://www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/not-ipr.xhtml (last
modified Feb. 12, 2005) (noting that "the term systematically distorts and confuses these issues,
and its use was and is promoted by those who gain from this confusion").
6. See Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connection Between
Land and Copyright (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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"Intellectual property" is today a generic title for patents, copyright, trademarks,
design rights, trade secrets and so forth. As an umbrella term, it became common in
the 1960s with the setting up of the UN organ, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO to its supplicants and its revilers). Before that, the idea of
to rights over inventions, aesthetic works, and
attributingthe quality of property
7
brands was looked at askance.

While Professor Cornish may be correct in tracing the term's common
usage to WIPO, history seems to suggest that the "idea of attributing the
quality of property to rights over inventions, aesthetic works, and brands"8
was not looked at askance before the creation of this specialized agency. As
early as the nineteenth century, the label "literary and artistic property" had
been used to denote rights in literary and artistic works, which were
internationally recognized by the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works in 1886.' Likewise, the title of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property specifically referenced
rights in industrial creations as "industrial property."'
In the United States, for example, the use of the term can be dated back
to at least the eighteenth century. As my colleague, Adam Mossoff, noted,
property had been used as a basis for protecting intellectual creations in state
copyright statutes enacted prior to the 1787 Constitutional Convention: "New
Hampshire, to name but one example, enacted legislation to protect copyrights
and other forms of intellectual property because'there being nopropertymore
peculiarly a man's own than that which is produced by the labour of his
mind.""' In addition, U.S. courts had used the term as early as the midnineteenth century. In the 1845 case of Davoll v. Brown, 2 a District of
Massachusetts Circuit Court defined intellectual property as "the labors of the
mind, productions and interests as much a man's own, and as much the fruit
of his honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears."' 3

7. WILLIAM CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OMNIPRESENT, DISTRACTING,
IRRELEVANT? 2 (2004) (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
revised at ParisJuly 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
10. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised
at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
11. Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 36 (2005)
(quoting Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius (1783), in COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED INTHE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 8

(1973)) (emphasis added).
12. 7 F. Cas. 197 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). Based on searches on Lexis-Nexis and
Westlaw, Davoll was the first case in U.S. history to use the term "intellectual property."
13. Id. at 199.
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The use of the property label to denote rights in intellectual creations and
inventions was equally popular in continental Europe in the nineteenth
century. For example, Etienne Blanc, the co-author of Code Gdngralde la
Propri&t6Industrielle,Litt~raireet Artistique, lamented in his 1854 book that
"[t]here [were] still today, even among the clearest thinkers, some who [did]
not see and [did] not comprehend property unless it [was] right before their
eyes in the material form of a piece of land or a house." 4 In addition, a
Belgian author titled his article in an economics journal La Proprit des
inventions est unproprOtgcomme une autre,5 while a large number of French
economists "refused to 16admit a logical difference between property in things
material and in ideas."'
Based on these historical accounts, it is therefore very difficult to assert,
as Professor Cornish did, that "the idea of attributing the quality of property
to rights over inventions, aesthetic works, and brands was looked at askance"
before the establishment of WIPO.' 7 Instead, what was "looked at askance"
was perhaps the use of the combination of the words "intellectual" and
"property" as a catch-all phrase to denote a large variety of disparate
rights-in other words, the "intellectualizing" of property. 8
In two recent articles, Professors Mark Lemley and Stewart Sterk
explored the problems of analogizing rights in intellectual creations and
inventions to real property. 9 Although they found problems with this
analogy, they concluded that it might be difficult to abandon the term. While
Professor Sterk suggested that it might be "far too late" to expunge from the
copyright debate the rhetoric of property," ° Professor Lemley noted that

14. Etienne Blanc, Introduction to E. BLANC & A. BEAUME, CODE GENERAL DE LA
PROPRIIT INDUSTRIELLE, LITTRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE (1854), quotedin Fritz Machlup & Edith
Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 11 n.34
(1950).
15. C. Le Hardy de Beaulieu, La propridtddes inventions est un propriit comme une
autre, 12 JOURNAL DES ECONOMISTEs 251 (1868), cited in Machlup & Penrose, supra note 14,
at 11 n.34.
16. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 14, at I I n.34. Among the economists cited are
Frederic Passy, V. Modeste, J. Simon, and Joseph Gamier. Their economic view, however, is
incorrect. See Lemley, supra note 2 (discussing the different economic characteristics of real
and intellectual property).
17. CORNISH, supra note 7, at 2.
18. Professor Sterk aptly titled his article "'Intellectualizing' Property." Sterk, supra
note 6.
19. Lemley, supra note 2; Sterk, supra note 6.
20. Sterk, supra note 6, at 43; see also Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual
Property Through a Property Paradigm,54 DuKE L.J. 1, 145 (2004) ("The propertization of

IP has encouraged and cemented [the recent trends in the expansion and development of
intellectual property), and it is too late in the game to reverse course.").
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intellectual property "has come of age... [and] no longer needs to turn to
some broader area of legal theory to seek legitimacy."'"
Like Professors Lemley and Sterk, I believe "intellectual property" will
remain in common usage despite the uneasy analogy. Although the term tends
to encourage over-generalization of disparate rights, there is a practical need
for the existence of an umbrella term. Today, "[i]ntellectual property is no
longer a sleepy legal backwater, but a prime area of economic activity."22 As
a result, intellectual property rights have grown beyond just copyrights,
patents, trademarks, and trade secrets and now cover such areas as
geographical indications, industrial designs, layout designs of integrated
circuits, and plant variety protection. 2' As the intellectual property system
evolves, new sui generis rights 24 and sector-specific protection will continue
to emerge. 25 An umbrella term is therefore needed to facilitate business
transactions and international negotiations.
To replace the problematic term, commentators have suggested several
alternatives. For example, Professor Wendy Gordon proposed to use the
acronym GOLEM, which stands for "Government-Originated Legally
Enforced Monopolies, 26 while others have suggested IMPs, which stands for
"Imposed Monopoly Privileges. '27 Richard Stallman went even further to
explain why we did not need to introduce an alternative term. As he
maintained, an umbrella term "is a mirage, which appears to have a coherent

21.

Lemley, supra note 2, at 1096.

22. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to HaveSomething to Say? One View
of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 304 (2004).
23. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OFTHE URUGUAYROUND vol. 31,33 I.L.M. 1197(1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs Agreement].
24. There are currently serious talks about implementing sui generis protection of
databases and traditional knowledge at both the domestic and international levels.
25. See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 23, art. 23, 33 I.L.M. at 1205 (protecting
geographical indications for wines and spirits); id. art. 27(3)(b), 33 I.L.M. at 1208 (protecting
plant varieties); id. art. 35, 33 I.L.M. at 1211 (protecting layout-designs or topographies of
integrated circuits).
26. The acronym GOLEM originated in Jewish folklore "to identify a Frankenstein-like
automaton that, although formed to assist its creator, turns into a monster when misused."
Wendy Gordon, Remarks at the 2004 Work-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium at
Boston University School of Law (Sept. 11, 2004).
27. See Stallman, supra note 5 (discussing IMPs, GOLEMs and other suggestions to
replace the term "intellectual property"); see also Tom W. Bell, Authors' Welfare: Copyright
as a Statutory Mechanism for RedistributingRights, 69 BROoK. L. REv. 229 (2003) (treating
copyright as "author's welfare").
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existence onlybecause the term suggests it does." 2 Unfortunately, Stallman's
advice is difficult to follow in today's commodified world, and the proposed
alternatives remain unfamiliar to the public.
Notwithstanding its problems, the property label has its attractions,
especially if we can be "clear about what is meant when the term is used in the
context of information., 29 Although people tend to focus on the absolute
nature of property-the right to exclude in particular-real property law
contains many limitations, safeguards, and obligations, such as adverse
possessions, eminent domain, easements, servitudes, nuisance, zoning,
irrevocable licenses, the Rule Against Perpetuities, and the waste and public
trust doctrines. Recently, a number of scholars has proposed to use the limits
to property to prevent the further expansion of intellectual property rights. For
example, Professor James Boyle noted the importance of "look[ing] at the
opposite of property with the same historical care, analytical precision, and
occasional utopian romanticism that we display when looking at property."30
Professor Michael Carrier discussed the use of limits in property law to cabin
intellectual property rights. Professor Jacqueline Lipton underscored the
need to go beyond these limits to locate affirmative legal duties on
information property holders in an effort to facilitate competing interests in
their property. 2
I. THE INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM
In recent years, commentators have been concerned about the "one-way
ratchet" of intellectual property protection. 33 As Professor Boyle and others
alerted us, we are now facing a "second enclosure movement" similar to the
movement to transform the "commons" of arable land into private property.34
Stallman, supra note 5.
Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property:Rights and Responsibilities,56 FLA. L.
REV. 135, 142 (2004).
30. James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 1, 32. The "opposite of property" includes the "limitations, negations,
inversions and correctives" of property. Id. at 31-32.
31. See Carrier, supra note 20, at 52-144.
32. See Lipton, supra note 29, at 165-89.
33. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should UsersStrike Back?, 71 U. CH.
L. REV. 21, 22 (2004); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33. But see Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public
Domain, 71 U. CHi. L. REV. 183 (2004) (highlighting public actions taken to invigorate the
public domain).
34. See James Boyle, Fencing Off Ideas: Enclosure and the Disappearanceof the
PublicDomain, DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 13; Boyle, supra note 33; see also Yochai Benkler,
28.

29.
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In this movement, information becomes increasingly privatized, and
intellectual property continues to expand. Even worse for consumers,
protection has moved upstream. Instead of protecting just the latest computer
program or the biologically-engineered microorganism, intellectual property
rights holders are now pushing for protection of data, proteins, and
information bits." Thus, Professor Boyle has called for a new "politics of
intellectual property." As he explained:
[A] successful political movement needs a set of (popularizable) analytical tools
which reveal common interests around which political coalitions can be built. Just
as "the environment" literally disappeared as a concept in the analytical structure of
private property claims, simplistic "cause and effect" science, and markets
characterized by negative externalities, so too the "public domain" is disappearing,
both conceptually and literally, in an intellectual property system built around the
interests of the current stakeholders and the notion of the original author. In one very
real sense, the environmental movement invented the environment so that farmers,
consumers, hunters and birdwatchers could all discover themselves as
environmentalists. Perhaps we need to invent
the public domain in order to call into
36
being the coalition that might protect it.

Professor Boyle's comparison of the intellectual property system to our
depleting environment cannot be more appropriate. As he explained by
reference to the environment movement:
The invention of the concept of "the environment" pulls together a string of otherwise
disconnected issues, offers analytical insight into the blindness implicit in prior ways
of thinking, and leads to perception of common interest where none was seen before.
Like the environment, the public domain must be "invented" before it is saved. Like
the environment, like "nature," the public domain turns out to be a concept that is
considerably more slippery than many of us realize. And, like the environment,
the
37
public domain nevertheless turns out to be useful, perhaps even necessary.

Today, the information ecosystem is heavily depleted, and technology,
information resources, and public domain materials have become the new
endangered species. If we are to save the information environment, we not
only need a new politics, but a new conceptual framework to reframe the
public intellectual property debate.
Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (1999).
35. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progressof
Biomedicine, LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289,289 (observing that "[t]he
tradition of open science has eroded considerably over the past quarter century as proprietary
claims have reached farther upstream from end products to cover fundamental discoveries that
provide the knowledge base for future product development").
36. James Boyle, A Politicsof Intellectual Property:Environmentalismfor the Net?,
47 DUKEL.J. 87, 113 (1997).
37. Boyle, supra note 33, at 52.
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There are at least three main reasons why the information ecosystem
would provide an ideal framework. First, it reminds policymakers and
commentators of the problems of the current bipolar intellectual property
debate. Second, it highlights the different components of the intellectual
property system and the interactions among these components. Third, it
underscores the need to take a holistic perspective and consider intellectual
property laws and policies as one of the many components of a larger
information ecosystem.
A. The Bipolar Intellectual Property Debate
A discussion of the information ecosystem would enable us to explore
issues obscured by the current bipolar intellectual property debate.38 Today,
when people talk about intellectual property laws and policies, they tend to
focus on the dichotomy between corporate and consumer interests, between
the interests of developed and less developed countries, and between private
and public goods. However, these dichotomies are misleading; they do not
work well from the standpoint of intellectual property policy, and they tend
to confuse rather than promote policy discussions.
Consider, for example, the debate concerning folklore, traditional
knowledge, and indigenous practices. Those who are sympathetic to the plight
of less developed countries often consider themselves low-protectionists, who
favor limited protection of intellectual property.39 To them, it is very
important to have more access to generic drugs, open source software, and
non-copyright-protected textbooks. However, as far as traditional knowledge
is concerned, this group often finds itself on the side of high-protectionists,
along with Big Pharma and multinational agrochemical conglomerates. As
much as they want to have free and open access to copyrighted and patented
products, they also believe that the same free access to indigenous knowledge
and materials would lead to biopiracy that could jeopardize the heritage and

38. See James Boyle, Enclosingthe Genome: What the Squabblesover GeneticPatents
Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 107-09
(F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (describing the "bipolar disorders of intellectual property policy");
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1331, 1334 (2004) (expressing concern "that the increasingly binary tenor ofcurrent intellectual
property debates.., obscures other important interests, options, critiques, and claims forjustice
that are embedded in many new claims for property rights").
39. The high-protectionists, in contrast, favor strong protection of intellectual property
rights. For the purposes of this discussion, the term "low-protectionists" also include antiprotectionists, who are against protection of intellectual property rights.
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culture of indigenous communities-or worse, threaten the very survival of
these communities."
Similarly, policymakers in less developed countries often find
themselves confronted with contradictory intellectual property policies. A
case in point is India. Because of its booming computer software and movie
industries, it is logical for policymakers in India to push for stronger
protection of computer software and audiovisual works. 1 (They might also
be interested in facilitating the development of open source software.)
However, this high-protectionist rhetoric has to be toned down dramatically
when dealing with patented chemicals, protected drugs, and public health

issues. Instead of stronger protection, the country will benefit from weaker
protection, or even special exceptions, for pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food,
and agricultural products. 2 Thus, it is unwise for policymakers and

commentators to take either a high-protectionist or low-protectionist position
without considering which economic sectors are at issue.43
Today, the intellectual property debate is highly polarized. Policymakers

and commentators tend to fall into one of the two rival camps: the highprotectionists or the low-protectionists---or in academic parlance, the
maximalists or the minimalists. 4 While the low-protectionists emphasize the
need to preserve a rich public domain and to ensure free access to, and
distribution of, valuable information and raw materials, the high-protectionists
query the impracticality of this position and underscore the strong need for

40. Indeed, many less developed countries are concerned about open access policies.
To these countries, "free and open access [has) the tendency to suggest 'a commons where
resources are up for grabs by the most technologically advanced."' Chander & Sunder, supra
note 38, at 1356 n.131 (quoting J.M Spectar, Saving the Ice Princess:NGOs, Antarctica &
InternationalLaw in the New Millennium, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 57, 63 (1999)).
41. See, e.g., COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 97 (2003) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT] (discussing the India

software industry); Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalizationof IntellectualProperty: New
Challengesfrom the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 929, 940 n.22 (2002) (discussing Bollywood, the India movie industry).
42. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41, at 20 (discussing the weaker patent
protection offered to pharmaceutical products in India).
43. Indeed, the United States refused to join the Berne Convention until 1988, even
though it played an instrumental role in the early development of the Paris Convention, which
it ratified in 1887, more than a century before it joined the Berne Convention. See generally
Peter K. Yu, Currentsand Crosscurrentsin the InternationalIntellectualPropertyRegime, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 323 (2004).
44. See Boyle, supra note 38, at 107; see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TOTHE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 14-15 (rev. ed. 2003) (discussing the
"copyright optimists" and the "copyright pessimists").
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incentives to encourage authors and inventors to create. Some of the highprotectionists also maintain that authors and inventors deserve legal protection
of their personhood interests45 and property entitlements arising from their
creative or inventive labor.46
When these two groups argue, they often talkpasteach other, rather than
48
to each other.47 At times, they even accuse their rivals of being "greedy,
doing "evil," 49 or committing thefts50 and piracy. 5 What they do not realize,
or at least refuse to acknowledge, is that their positions represent two sides of
the same coin. By not talking to each other, they therefore fail to work

45. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982); Justin Hughes, The PersonalityInterestofA rtistsandInventors in IntellectualProperty,
16 CARDOZO ARTS &ENT. L.J. 81 (1998).
46. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the NaturalLaw of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Wendy
J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Propertyand the RestitutionaryImpulse, 78
VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property?Putting the PiecesBack Together,
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371 (2003); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the NaturalLaw: Copyright as Labor
and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
47. See David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism,69 Mo. L. REV. 1 (2004)
(exploring "why those who debate copyright often seem to talk past each other").
48. See Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 61 (2002) ("I have a theory about how copyright got a bad name for itself, and I
can summarize it in one word: Greed. Corporate greed and consumer greed.").
49. See Cynthia M. Ho, Attacking the Copyright Evildoers in Cyberspace,55 SMU L.
REV. 1561 (2002).
50. See Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005) (discussing why the recording industry did not make the right analogy when
it compared individual file-sharers to shoplifters).
51. Although copyright holders often accuse of piracy those who make copies without
their authorization, piracy is in the eyes of the beholder. As Professor Peter Jaszi noted
insightfully, "[olne might say that one nation's 'piracy' is another man's 'technology transfer."'
Peter Jaszi, A Garlandof Reflections on Three InternationalCopyright Topics, 8 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 63 (1989). Moreover, as Philippine Activist Roberto Verzola observed:
If it is a sin for the poor to steal from the rich, it must be a much bigger sin for
the rich to steal from the poor. Don't rich countries pirate poor countries' best
scientists, engineers, doctors, nurses and programmers? When global corporations
come to operate in the Philippines, don't they pirate the best people from local firms?
If it is bad for poor countries like ours to pirate the intellectual property of rich
countries, isn't it a lot worse for rich countries like the US to pirate our intellectuals?
In fact, we are benign enough to take only a copy, leaving the original behind;
rich countries are so greedy that they take away the originals, leaving nothing behind.
Roberto Verzola, Pegging the World's Biggest, EARTH ISLAND J., Spring 1997, at 41,.41,
=
available at http://www.earthisland.org/eijournal/newarticles.cfm?articlelD
311 &joumalID=50, quoted in Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International
Copyright Convention Must Be Repealed, 40 Hous. L. REV. 763, 764 (2003).
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together to create a positive dialogue that is conducive to reforming the
intellectual property system.s2
A bipolar debate is particularly problematic in the intellectual property
area. Unlike physical goods, intellectual property is nonexcludable and
nonrivalrous in nature. "The relationship between the public domain and the
restrictions around it is [therefore] a complex dynamic equilibrium, not a
simplistic binary choice." 3 Moreover, a debate in binary terms tends to
obscure the possibilities of hybrid policy choices and regulatory schemes, as
well as useful concepts like "semicommons." 4 For example, commentators
have traditionally considered the public domain the "conceptual opposite" of
intellectual property." However, as Professor Pamela Samuelson pointed out,
"the public domain consists . . . of a vast and diverse assortment of
contents . . . [and is] different sizes at different times and in different
countries." 6 The "conceptual opposite" of intellectual property, therefore,
may not reflect the rich diversity of public domain materials.
In fact, some contents do not fit well in either the intellectual property
or public domain category. Open source and free software, as well as
materials licensed under a creative commons license, are good examples.
Although the protection of these contents depends on the existence of the
copyright system, they provide great flexibility for others to adapt and build

52. As Professor Samuelson explained:
To be successful, a new public-regarding politics of intellectual property must have
a positive agenda of its own. It cannot just oppose whatever legislative initiatives the
major content industry organizations support (although it almost certainly will need
to do this as well). It should be grounded on the realization that information is not
only or mainly a commodity; it is also a critically important resource and input to
learning, culture, competition, innovation, and democratic discourse. Intellectual
property must find a home in a broader-based information policy, and be a servant,
not a master, of the information society.
Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the DigitalPublic Domain: Threats and Opportunities,LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 147, 170-71.
53. Boyle, supra note 30, at 12.
54. See Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1127, 1130-31 (2003) (noting that "[i]nformation ownership can better be described as a
semicommons, a form ofownership that acknowledges the dynamic relationship between private
and common uses"); see also Henry E. Smith, Semicommon PropertyRights and Scatteringin
the Open Fields,29 J.LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000) (articulating a theory of semicommon property
rights).
55. See Boyle, supra note 30, at 8.
56. Samuelson, supra note 52, at 148 (footnote omitted); see also Boyle, supra note 33,
at 68 (noting that "jjust as there are many 'properties,' so too there are many 'public
domains'); David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 463, 463 (noting that "the term 'public domain' is elastic and inexact"
and its definition is "a function of perspective and agenda").
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on the materials without paying any royalties. In Professor Samuelson's
words, these materials are "outside the public domain in theory, but seemingly
inside in effect."5 7 Indeed, because of the hybrid nature of these contents,
those who advocate low-protectionist positions have to be very careful about
what policies they push for. 8 For example, a maximalist interpretation of the
General Public License ("GPL") used in open source software may ultimately
create precedents that will further high-protectionist positions. Nevertheless,
without such an interpretation, the GPL may not be able to achieve its original
objective, i.e., to require those who redistribute software to "pass along the
freedom to further copy and change it."59
B. A Multistakeholder Debate
A focus on the information ecosystem also reminds commentators and
policymakers of the existence of, and interactions among, the different
components of the intellectual property system. This is particularly important,
as public interest organizations are often underrepresented in the legislative
and policymaking processes. As the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights observed:
Too often the interests of the "producer" dominate in the evolution of IP policy, and
that of the ultimate consumer is neither heard nor heeded. So policy tends to be
determined more by the interests of the commercial users of the system, than by an
impartial conception of the greater public good. In IPR discussions between
developed and developing countries, a similar imbalance exists. The trade ministries
of developed nations are mainly influenced by producer interests who see the benefit
to them of stronger IP protection in their export markets, while the consumer nations,
mainly the developing countries, are less able to identify and represent their own
60
interests against those of the developed nations.

57. Samuelson, supra note 52, at 149.
58. This issue has been extensively discussed on the Section of Intellectual Property
Law Panel at the 2005 AALS Annual Meeting in San Francisco. In recent years, the open
source movement has inspired developments in other areas. For example, commentators are
now exploring the application of the open source model to biomedical and genomic research.
See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's Genome, or Coase and Open Source
Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Open and Collaborative
Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INFRONTIER
INDUSTRIES: SOFrWARE AND BIOTECH (Robert Hahn ed., forthcoming), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract id=574863; see also Boyle, supra note 38.
59. What is Copyleft?, Free Software Foundation, at http://www.fsf.org/licensing/
essays/copyleft.html/view?searchterr=copyleft (last modified Feb. 12, 2005).
60. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41, at 7.
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To recalibrate the balance in the intellectual property system,
policymakers need to include as many stakeholders as they can in the
legislative and policymaking processes. 6' Such recalibration is particularly
important when digital materials are involved. After all, the information
revolution has transformed virtually everybody into a stakeholder in the global
information society. Moreover, as I pointed out elsewhere, there is a widening
divide between intellectual property rights holders, who are eager to protect
their interests, and users of protected contents and materials, who do not have
or understand their stakes in the system.62 Until these users do, they are
unlikely to be satisfied and be willing to consent to stronger protection of the
rights holders.
The lack of participation is particularly acute in the traditional
knowledge debate. As many scholars and indigenous rights activists have
pointed out, negotiations concerning protection of traditional knowledge are
often hampered by lack of participation by indigenous communities.6 3
Although this lack is often caused by policymakers' omissions, there remains
significant reluctance in the indigenous community to participate in the
negotiation process. While a number of them harbor grave concerns about
further abuse, misappropriation, and exploitation of their arts and crafts, many
others find it inappropriate to participate due to the secretive nature of some
of their creations and practices, in particular sacred symbols and religious
rituals.6 4
To make things more complicated, many indigenous creations do not fit
well within the Western worldview and intellectual tradition, the capitalist
philosophy, or the contemporary notion of individual authorship-all ofwhich
underlie the development of the existing intellectual property system. As the
Bellagio Declaration noted:

61. In the digital copyright context, for example, possible stakeholders include
intellectual creators, business enterprises, libraries, educational and research institutions,
government authorities, standard-setting bodies, and individual end-users.
62. See generallyPeterK.Yu, The CopyrightDivide,25 CARDOZOL. REv.331 (2003).
63. See Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition oflndigenous Peoples'and Community
TraditionalKnowledge in InternationalLaw, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 275, 284-85 (2001)
(noting that a dialogue can only be established "when indigenous peoples are full partners in
this dialogue, with full juridical standing and only when the their cultural world views,
customary laws, and ecological practices are recognized as fundamental contributions to
resolving local social justice concerns"); Peter K. Yu, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual
Property,and Indigenous Culture:An Introduction, IICARDOZO J. INT'L &COMP. L. 239,240
(2003) (noting that negotiations on this issue are complicated by the failure to include the
indigenous community in the process).
64.

See Yu, supra note 63, at 244-45.
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Contemporary intellectual property law is constructed around the notion ofthe author,
the individual, solitary and original creator, and it is for this figure that its protections
are reserved. Those who do not fit this model--custodians of tribal culture and
medical knowledge, collectives practicing traditional artistic and music forms, or
peasant cultivators of valuable seed varieties, for example--are denied intellectual
property protection. 65

In the international intellectual property arena, the lack of participation
is equally problematic. Commentators have widely criticized the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs
Agreement") for its "coercive" and "imperialistic" nature.66 They also have
faulted the World Trade Organization for "the lack of transparency of [its]
dispute settlement proceedings, limited access by non-members to the dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body, technical and financial difficulties
confronting less developed countries in implementing their treaty obligations,
and the insensitivity and undemocratic nature of the decisionmaking
processes. '67 Most recently, commentators have become concerned that
bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements will take away the autonomy
of countries to tailor their intellectual property policies to local needs,
interests, and goals, and to develop legal systems through experimentation
with new regulatory and economic policies.68 Some also fear that recent

65. The Bellagio Declaration (Mar. 1I,1993), reprinted in BOYLE, supra note 4, at 193.
66. See Peter K. Yu, Towarda Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving GlobalIntellectual
Property Disputes: What We Can Learnfrom Mediators,Business Strategists,andInternational
Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 585-86 (2002).
67. Id. (footnote omitted); see also GAIL E. EVANS, LAWMAKING UNDER THE TRADE
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN LEGISLATING BY THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 201 (2000)

(arguing that states signing the Uruguay Round Agreement "have little choice but compliance");
Robert F. Housman, DemocratizingInternationalTrade Decision-making,27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 699 (1994) (criticizing the lack of democratic processes in international trade decisionmaking); Michael H. Shuman, GA77zilla v. Communities, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 527, 530
(1994) (noting that "the most insidious feature of the GATT is that it systematically strips
communities of powers they might otherwise use to protect themselves against the adverse
effects of the global economy"). But see John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV.L. REV. 511 (2000) (discussing the democratic potential of the
WTO).
68. See Yu, supra note 43. For excellent discussions of the recent bilateral free trade
agreements, see generally DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND
A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA) (2003), availableat
http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/FTAA(A4).pdf; Peter Drahos, Bits and Bips-Bilateralism
in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to
Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in InternationalIntellectual PropertyProtection,I U.OTTAWA
L. & TECH. J. 127 (2004).
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developments will "roll back both substantive and strategic gains of the TRIPS
Agreement for developing countries."6 9
C. The Systems Approach
A better understanding of the information ecosystem would enable
policymakers and commentators to take a holistic perspective when they
evaluate intellectual property laws and policies. It also would remind them
that these laws and policies constitute only one of the many components of the
information ecosystem.
In recent years, commentators have applied the complexity theory to the
field of environmental law,70 while others have brought related insights to the
information arena.7 As of this writing, however, the complexity theory
remains largely outside the standard field of inquiry among intellectual
property scholars. It is therefore time for us to inject these valuable insights
into the intellectual property debate.7 2 As Professor J.B. Ruhl has noted:
The great lesson of dynamical systems theory for law reform, therefore, is that it is the
system that counts as much as the rules, and that we cannot effectively change only
one variable of that equation and expect the others to remain static. Ceterisparibus
doesn't exist. Our legal institutions, however, have become prolific producers of
rules of conduct, and our legal theory has focused for the most part on divining the
meta-rules to explain those rules. We need some attention to the system at the
structural level. 73

69. Okediji, supra note 68, at 129.
70. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, ProbabilitiesBehaving Badly: Complexity Theory and
Environmental Uncertainty,37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003).
71. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of
Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495 (2004); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On
the Regulation of Networks as Complex Systems, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
72. Cf.J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the
Evolution of Law and Society and Its PracticalMeaningfor Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1407, 1437 (1996). As Professor Ruhl noted:
If we liken the sociolegal system to an ecosystem, and laws to species, [complexity
theory will provide insight into such questions as] how will each law, with its unique
historical origins and set of legal genes, respond to and be affected by the rest of the
sociolegal community, and how will the sociolegal community as a whole evolve as
a result of all or any of the laws doing so?
Id.
73. J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigmfor the DynamicalLaw-and-Society
System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45
DuKE L.J. 849, 916-17 (1996); see also id. at 851 ("If society evolves in response to changes
in law, and vice versa, then law and society must co-exist in an evolving system. Each needs
the other to define itself.").
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The use of the complexity theory has at least three benefits. First, it
captures the complex manner in which components interact with one another
in an integrated system. 4 As meteorologist Edward Lorenz put it insightfully,
the flap of a butterfly's wings in Brazil could set off a tornado in Texas.7 5
Although complex systems have governing meta-principles, we may not be
able to "find them by slicing up the system into smaller parts."76 Thus, it is
important for us to have a holistic perspective of the system. Such. an
approach also allows us to focus on the interactions among the different
components and to have "a greater appreciation of the forces at play in the
interaction of law and society."77
Second, the complexity theory allows us to focus on the self-correction
mechanisms within the system. In doing so, it enables us to focus on
adaptiveness and explore the tipping point at which the system goes from
order to chaos. As complexity theory researcher Stuart Kauffman observed:
"complex systems constructed such that they are poised on the boundary
between order and chaos are the ones best able to adapt by mutation and
selection. Such poised systems appear to be best able to coordinate complex,
flexible behavior and best able to respond to changes in their environment."7
The key question in the information age, therefore, is not whether we should
have an intellectual property system (although that question is still important
and worth exploring). Rather, it is how we can achieve sustainable
development of intellectual property-how we can meet our current needs
while preserving the potential for future generations to meet their own needs.
To some extent, the intellectual property system functions like a
hydraulic system; a change in the system may be offset by an identical change
in the opposite direction. Consider the copyright system, for example. It
grants to rights holders exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute,
perform, and display the copyrighted work. However, it also qualifies most
of its rights with safeguards that protect the public domain against
impovertization. These safeguards include the originality requirement, the fair
use/fair dealing privilege, the idea/expression dichotomy, durational limits of

74. Spulber & Yoo, supra note 71.
75. Edward Lorenz "describes a Brazilian butterfly that by beating its wings creates a
movement of air that by joining with other currents transforms the weather in Texas." Paul D.
Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilitiesof Law Teachingin a Democracy, 41 DUKE L.J.
741, 743 (1992) (quoting Edward Lorenz, Predictability:Does the Flap of a Butterfly's Wings
in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1979)).
76. Ruh], supra note 73, at 893.
77. Id. at 853.
78.

STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER 29 (1993), quoted in Ruhl, supra

note 73, at 891-92.
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protection, and other public interest exceptions. For instance, commentators
have proposed to use the fair use privilege to offset the effects of the recent
copyright term extension.7 9 Others, including myself, have also underscored
the need to introduce affirmative public access rights for individual endusers.8" As Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss reasoned, "[u]ser access did not need
specific delineation when it was the background rule; only the exceptionalism
of intellectual property rights required express definition. But if the new
background is proprietary control, then the exceptionalism of user rights now
needs to be embedded into positive law."8
Third, the complexity theory highlights the interactions among different
components of the system. It therefore reminds us that intellectual property
policies may have spillover effects and unintended consequences. For
example, commentators have discussed at length the broad, unintended
consequences of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). s2
Although the statute was initially designed to protect copyright holders, it has
now been used to stifle innovation and competition over such products as
79. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003)
(proposing to include in the fair use analysis "when the unauthorized use occurs in the copyright
term"); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002)
(proposing to "adjust the scope of copyright protection to account for the passage of time by
expressly considering time as a factor in fair use analysis"); William F. Patry & Richard A.
Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004)
(offering to solve the access problem caused by the recent copyright term extension "by
continued evolution of the judicially shaped doctrine of fair use or by a modest amendment to
the Copyright Act"); cf Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 65 (noting that the recent copyright term
extension "put pressure on the system to offset the gain in years with a diminution in the scope
of protection, for example, through amore vigorously implemented fair use exception, not only
during the last 20 years, but perhaps throughout the copyright term").
80. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 33 (arguing for the need to use the next round of
GATT negotiations to add explicit user rights to the TRIPs Agreement); see also Ruth Okediji,
Towardan InternationalFairUse Doctrine,39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 75, 87 (2000) (noting
the lack of an international fair use doctrine in current international copyright law and
contending that "such adoctrine is vital for effectuating traditional copyright policy in a global
market for copyrighted works as well as for capitalizing on the benefits of protecting intellectual
property under the free trade system"); Peter K. Yu, The Trust and Distrust of Intellectual
Property Rights, 16 REVUE QUEBECOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2005)
(articulating the need for the international community to recognize our fundamental needs to
have free, universal, sustainable, and quality access to protected information for future
intellectual creations).
81. Dreyfuss, supranote 33, at 27; see also SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC
LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 146 (2003) (noting the need to
"highlight[] the fact that what may be granted maybe taken away when such grants conflict with
other important goals," such as freedom of expression or public health).
82. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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printer toner cartridges, garage door openers, electronic pets, and voting
machines. s3 The DMCA has also upset the historical balance between
copyright interests and access to information, thus raising serious concerns
about free speech, privacy, academic freedom, learning, culture, and
democratic discourse. 4
In a few months, the United States Supreme Court will decide MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 5 At issue in the case is
whether the distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies should be
liable for copyright infringement committed by individuals using their
products. This case is important from the standpoint of ecosystem
management, because it will allow the Court to revisit its earlier decision in
Sony CorporationofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 6 which has farreaching consequences in the technology and innovation areas.87 Although the
parties disagree over whether peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies are
significantly different from other copying technologies that are currently
protected by Sony, Grokster is likely to have substantial spillover effects on
many different economic sectors regardless how it is decided. 8
D. An Illustration
Although it is impossible to completely understand how the information
ecosystem operates, or to ascertain all the meta-principles governing the
system, we may be able to effectively manage the system without all the
information. We just need to know enough, and a systems approach would
enable us to acquire the needed information. As an illustration of how we can
change from the binary, or perhaps adversary, approach to the systems
approach, consider Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See Yu, supra note 50.
For a collection of criticisms of the DMCA, see Yu, supra note 62, at 393 n.450.
380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
See Brief Amici Curiae Sixty Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors

and the United States Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery
at 4, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (No. 04-480)
(noting that Grokster "is fundamentally about technology policy, not about file sharing or
copyright infringement"); see also Adam Candeub & Peter K. Yu, Supreme Court Shouldn 't
Decide FutureofInternet, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 29,2005, at 9A (noting that Grokster"touches
on questions of technology and innovation"). The author has signed on to this brief.
88. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, Preface to COPYRIGHT
ISSUES INDIGITAL MEDIA viii (2004) (noting that "[c]hanges to copyright law... can have
ramifications that extend beyond the concerns of producers and consumers of copyrighted
material to the well-being of related sectors of the economy"), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfn?index=5738&sequence= 1.
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which is often cited as the human rights justification for intellectual property
protection. Article 27 provides:
(1)

Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the

community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2)
Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
89
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

If one were to read these two provisions with a binary lens, one would say that
the former covers cultural rights and the protection of the public domain,
while the latter focuses on intellectual property protection. Under this
reading, both articles cover very important rights and have the potential to
compete with each other in achieving their objectives. To avoid conflict, one
needs to reconcile the two provisions, or at least alleviate the tension between
the two.
The systems approach, however, may allow us to avoid, or at least
manage, the conflict. Because this approach primarily focuses on the
interactions among the many components of the system, it encourages
policymakers to focus on the relationship between the different components
and their common goal. For example, we may read the two provisions as
fulfilling two noncompeting objectives. Under this reading, individuals have
both the right to enjoy the arts and share in scientific advancement and its
benefits and the right to protection of their intellectual creations. Because the
two provisions are related and interdependent, one could read Article 27 as
providing an individual right to "enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits" so that the individual can attain "protection of
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author." One could also read it as
providing an individual right to attain "protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which
he is the author" so that the individual can "enjoy the arts and ... share in
scientific advancement and its benefits."
III. SYMPOSIA
Today, the intellectual property system affects more thanjust technology
and innovation. It touches on many other areas, such as agriculture, health,
education, culture, competition, trade, and democracy. As the system

89. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art.
27 (1948). Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
contains similar stipulations. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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continues to evolve, it will expand and become more complex. It will also
open up new opportunities while confronting new challenges. To help us
better understand the dynamics within the information ecosystem, the
Intellectual Property & Communications Law Program at Michigan State
University College of Law, the James H. and Mary B. Quello Center for
Telecommunication Management & Law in the College of Communication
Arts & Sciences, and the Michigan State Law Review co-sponsored two
symposia. The first, "Harnessing the Swarm: Business Strategies, Rights
Management and Policy for the New Media," was held on February 24-25,
2004, in Washington, D.C. The second, "Intellectual Property, Sustainable
Development, and Endangered Species: Understanding the Dynamics of the
Information Ecosystem," was held on March 26-27, 2004, on the Michigan
State University campus. These two events brought together intellectual
property scholars, communications policy experts, property theorists,
economists, political scientists, and policymakers. What follows are some of
the papers presented at these events. I hope you will enjoy them.

